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WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
VOLUME 37

WINTER 1962

NUMBER 4

A COMMENT ON DAMAGES IN UNLAWFUL DETAINER
ACTIONS IN WASHINGTON
CORNELIUS J. PECK*

One might hope that the damage aspects of litigation under a statute
enacted in 1891 would now be so well explored and thoroughly understood as to be beyond the area of current comment. However, the
product of the years has been an accumulation of inconsistent and
ambiguous statements as well as a few instances of obvious conflict
between decisions, all of which goes to make a review appropriate.
Moreover, a recent decision' of the supreme court in a case which has
already been noted in these pages holds that set-offs and counterclaims
cannot be adjudicated in unlawful detainer proceedings-a holding
which takes on additional significance in light of the provisions for
doubling damages in unlawful detainer proceedings. Finally, adoption

of the new rules of pleading, practice, and procedure as a January 1,
1960, may have had a special significance with regard to pleading rules
developed under the unlawful detainer statute.
The section of the unlawful detainer statute respecting damages is
now found in RCW 59.12.170. It applies not only to unlawful detainer

actions, but also to actions for forcible entry and forcible detainer. The
language has remained unchanged since enactment of the statute in
1891.2 After providing that the consequences of a verdict for the plaintiff shall be restitution of the premises and, where appropriate, forfeiture of an existing lease, provision is then made for recovery of
damages:
... The jury, or the court, if the proceedings be tried without a jury,
shall also assess the damages occasioned, to the plaintiff by any forcible
entry, or by any forcible or unlawful detainer, alleged in the complaint
and proved on the trial, and, if the alleged unlawful detainer be after
default in the payment of rent, find the amount of any rent due, and the
judgment shall be rendered against the defendant guilty of the forcible

* Professor of Law, University of Washington.

'Young v. Riley, 159 Wash. Dec. 55, 365 P.2d 769 (1961), noted 37 WAsH. L. REv.

169 (1962).
2Wash. Sess. Laws, 1891, Cb. 96.
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entry, forcible detainer or unlawful detainer for twice the amount of

damages thus assessed and of the rent, if any, found due.3 (Emphasis
supplied.)

Provision is then made for relief from forfeiture of the lease in cases of
failure to pay rent by payment of the entire judgment and costs within
five days after entry.
The bases upon which one may become guilty of unlawful detainer
are set out in the statute. One may be guilty of unlawful detainer by
holding over after the expiration of a tenancy for a specific term, even
though no notice is given of termination of the tenancy. One may also
be guilty of unlawful detainer by holding over after service of a twentyday notice terminating a periodic tenancy. Or, failure to pay rent or
surrender the premises within three days after service of notice to quit
or pay rent constitutes unlawful detainer. Likewise, continued possession and failure to keep or perform any condition or covenant in a lease
within ten days after service of notice of the breach constitutes unlawful
detainer, as does continued possession more than three days after notice
is served of waste committed on the premises.4
At least in the case of failure to pay rent it is clear that a tenant is not
guilty of unlawful detainer until he has remained in possession more
than three days after service of a notice to quit or pay rent, and that the
unlawful detainer period consists of only those days following the threeday period.5 Presumably the same reasoning applies to other cases in
which service of a notice is required to establish an unlawful detainer.
TirE ELEMENTS OF DAMAGES
As reference to the statutory language will indicate, the monetary
aspect of a judgment in an unlawful detainer action consists of two
major elements: one, the damages occasioned by the unlawful detainer
of the premises, and the other the rent found due in actions brought for
failure to pay the rent. The other aspect of the judgment consists of the
restitution of the premises and the forfeiture of any existing lease. In
other jurisdictions it has been said that because unlawful detainer pro3 RCW 59.12.030.
4 RCW 59.12.030(6) also provides that unlawful detainer may be committed by one
who, without permission of the owner and without having color or title to land, enters
and fails or refuses to remove after three days after service of a written notice upon
him. Thus, as the court has noted, the existence of the landlord-tenant relationship is

not necessary to the maintenance of an action under that subsection. Commercial
Waterway Dist. No. 1 v. Larson, 26 Wn.2d 219, 173 P.2d 531 (1946); Columbia &
Puget Sound R. Co. v. Moss, 44 Wash. 589, 87 Pac. 951 (1906).
5 Wooding v. Sawyer, 38 Wn2d 381, 299 P.2d 535 (1951).
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ceedings are a special and summary statutory proceeding, only the
damages provided for in the statute may be recovered.6 Thus it is not
surprising to find Washington cases holding that title to personal property on the premises cannot be determined in unlawful detainer pro7
ceedings.
However, any conclusion that the damages recoverable in Washington under its unlawful detainer statute are limited to damages for the
unlawful detention and the rent is dissolved upon consideration of other
cases. Thus in an early case it was held that the amount due on a
covenant to pay taxes was recoverable in an unlawful detainer proceeding.' Another early case allowed recovery of the rental for a one
month period during which a house remained vacant after an unlawful
detainer, but since the court refused to allow a doubling of the rent for
that period it clearly did not treat it as an item of the damage "occasioned by" the unlawful detainer.' In the same case the court refused
to allow recovery of the alleged additional living expenses of the landlord, who moved from what was apparently an economical life in a hotel
to a more expensive life in the house, but the denial rested upon general
considerations of the law of damages rather than the limitations of unlawful detainer proceedings. A more recent decision held that because
the damages caused by removal of a building from leased premises were
recoverable in the unlawful detainer action which the landlord had
brought to recover possession of the premises, the bringing of that
action without claiming those damages constituted a waiver and precluded their recovery in a subsequent separate action. 10 Shortly thereafter the court refused to allow a doubling of the amount due on a note
given for rent that had accrued, treating the note as a settlement of the
rent claim and hence not an item to be doubled under the statutory
language.1 ' However, because counsel for the tenant did not object to
recovery on the note in an unlawful detainer proceeding, the court
approved a judgment including that amount. A more recent holding,
6

Harris v. Bissell, 54 Cal. App. 307, 202 Pac. 453 (1921) ; Forrester v. Cook, 77
Utah 137, 292 Pac. 206 (1930) ; Cf. Anderson v. Taylor, 56 Cal. 131, 38 Am. Rep. 52
(1880).
7 Little v. Catania, 48 Wn.2d 890, 297 P.2d 255 (1956) ; Provident Mutual Life Ins.
Co. v. Thrower, 155 Wash. 613, 285 Pac. 654 (1930) ; See Sowers v. Lewis, 49 Wn.2d
891, 307 P.2d 1064 (1957), noted 33 WAsH. L. REv. 165 (1958).
S Agen v. Nelson, 51 Wash. 431, 98 Pac. 1115 (1909). The amount was not doubled,
however, although the amount of the accrued rent was, thus giving emphasis to the fact
that the amount due on the covenant to pay taxes was not considered a portion of the
unlawful detainer damages.
0 Shannon v. Loeb, 65 Wash. 640, 118 Pac. 823 (1911).
10 Munro v. Irwin, 163 Wash. 452, 1 P.2d 329 (1931).
"Walker
1
v. Myers, 166 Wash. 392, 7 P.2d 21 (1932).
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however, is to the effect that the parties to an unlawful detainer proceeding cannot, by the agreement implied from their conduct, convert
an unlawful detainer proceeding into a general proceeding for the
settlement of their conflicting claims. 2 The most recent holding denied
a landlord's claim for the amount he had to pay to obtain insurance
coverage which it was the obligation of the tenant to purchase-the
reason being that the proceeding had been instituted upon a notice to
quit or pay rent, and that, while the accrued, unpaid rent could be
recovered, the claim on the insurance covenant was one over which the
court did not have jurisdiction in absence of the landlord's service of a
ten-day notice to perform that covenant of the lease. 3 In other words,
the amount due on a covenant to purchase insurance could not be recovered in an unlawful detainer action based on failure to pay rent.
Thus, as is frequently the case, doubt exists as to how many elements
of damage other than those caused by the unlawful detainer or the
accrual of rent can be recovered in such a proceeding. Whether a landlord should in a particular case assert all his claims against a tenant
can be determined only by balancing his concern that he will be held to
have waived some elements of damage by failure to include them
against the possibility of delay and reversal on appeal if he includes
them.
THE DOUBLING OF ACCRUED RENT

As a close reading of the damage provision of the statute quoted
above will reveal, the grammatical structure of the sentence is such as
to lead to the initial conclusion that in unlawful detainer proceedings
brought for failure to pay rent the judgment is to be entered for
not only double the damages occasioned by the unlawful detainer but
also for double all the accrued and unpaid rent. The prepositional
phrase "of the rent" must be attached to some antecedent noun, and the
only noun to which it can be attached is the word "amount." So placing
it subjects the delinquent rent to the doubling prescribed for damages.
If the word "of" had not been used or if the word "for" had been used
in its place, the judgment could be given for double the damages occasioned by the unlawful detainer but for only the actual amount of the
rent accrued. It was an analysis such as this which led the Montana
court to conclude that under comparable statutory language it had no
12 Little v. Catania, 48 Wn.2d 890, 297 P.2d 255 (1956).
Is Sowers v. Lewis, 49 Wn.2d 891, 301 P.2d 1064 (1957), noted 33 WAsn. L. Rv.
165 (1958).
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discretion to enter anything but a judgment for triple the accrued
rents. 4
The Washington court has yet to engage in such a grammatical
analysis of the statutory language. In a case involving only the damages
accruing during a period of unlawful detainer the court did say that,
"the statute is not susceptible of construction,"' 5 thereby manifesting a
conclusion that the language has but a single clear meaning. But a
readiness to read a penalty provision as having a single clear meaning
in a case in which the penalty bears a reasonable relationship to the
defendant's wrong does not carry over to the imposition of a penalty
which appears arbitrary because its severity depends upon factors
bearing little relation to the defendant's wrongdoing. Where damages
occasioned by an unlawful detainer are doubled, the total penalty inflicted bears a proportional relationship to the period of wrongful detention and hence to the wrong committed. But where the rent which
accrued prior to the period of unlawful detainer is doubled, the penalty
thus imposed bears no relation to the wrong of the defendant in remaining in possession of the property. Thus, if the strict grammatical
reading is used, a tenant whose financial difficulties caused him to fall
four months delinquent in rent may be visited with the penalty of
doubling that accrued rental for a period of unlawful detainer as short
as one or two days.
Possibly the tenant whose inability to manage his financial affairs
caused him to fall behind on rent payments does not present the most
sympathetic case for avoidance of a penalty. But what of a tenant who,
for example, has a valid claim against his landlord for failure to make
repairs, for failure to purchase insurance, or for a partial eviction? If
he does what seems a common sense thing-deduct his claim from the
rent due the landlord-he may find himself a defendant in an unlawful
detainer proceeding brought for failure to pay rent. Under the recent
decision of the Washington Supreme Court in Young v. Riley,"8 reference to which was made at the beginning of this comment, he will not
be able to assert either a set-off or a counterclaim in that proceeding.
The consequence will be that the tenant will be required to pay to his
landlord twice the amount of the tenant's valid claim against the landlord as the accrued rent which is doubled in the judgment. Of course,
in a separate action the tenant should be entitled to recover the amount
Mont. 466, 129 P.2d 101 (1942).
'1Bond v. Chapman, 34 Wash. 606, 76 Pac. 97 (1904).
10 159 Wash. Dec. 55, 365 P.2d 769 (1961), noted 37 WAsH. L. Ray. 169 (1962).
14 Steinbrenner v. Love, 113
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of his claim. But even if he does, the final result is that the landlord
has succeeded in making a net recovery from the tenant of the amount
which the tenant was entitled to recover from the landlord! It is a
weak answer to say that his plight is attributable to his lack of wisdom
in acting without legal advice when the action he took is one which is
fully in accord with general community standards and practices. Perhaps the answer is, as suggested in the note on Young v. Riley previously published in these pages, 17 that that decision must fall before the
reasoning of other Washington cases with which it is in conflict. Another possible solution lies in a careful consideration of the damage
provision of the unlawful detainer statute.
The Washington court has long and firmly declared that the doctrine
of exemplary or punitive damages is unsound in principle and that
such damages cannot be recovered except when explicitly allowed by
statute.18 A legislative agreement with a general policy against punitive
damages may be found in the hasty repeal of a punitive damage statute
which apparently slipped through the last session of the legislature
1
without attracting attention until it had become lawY
Like other
0
courts, the Washington court has indicated that penal provisions requiring the doubling of damages should be strictly construed. Thus in
one case it said,2 1 "It seems to us that the statutory double rent and
damage right of a landlord against his tenant is not a right which the
landlord may successfully invoke, except by a very clear showing of
such right." (For present purposes, however, the significance of the
statement is limited by the fact that it was made in the course of an
opinion which, while denying the doubling of the value of a note given
for rent past due, did permit the doubling of other rent which had
accrued prior to the period of unlawful detainer.)
In a number of cases the Washington court has prescribed the
doubling of the accrued rent in the computation of the amount of a
judgment to be entered for unlawful detainer following a failure to
17 Id.

18 Grays Harbor County v. Bay City Lumber Co., 47 Wn.2d 879, 289 P.2d 975 (1955)
noted 31 WAsHa. L. Rxv. 135 (1956) ; Delano v. Tennent, 138 Wash. 39, 244 Pac. 273
(1926)
; Spokane Truck and Dray Co. v. Hoefer, 2 Wash. 45, 25 Pac. 1072 (1891).
9
- Wash. Sess. Laws, Ex. Sess. 1961, Ch. 27, repealing Ch. 97, Laws of 1961. A
committee was created, to be appointed by the Governor, to make an investigation of
the field of damages and exemplary damages and to make recommendations to the next
session of the legislature with respect to the desirability of further legislation on the
subject.
20
E.g., Forrester v. Cook, 77 Utah 137, 292 Pac. 206 (1930) ; see also cases cited 26
C.J., ForcibleEntry and Detainer,863, n.39.
21 Walker v. Myers, 166 Wash. 392, 397, 7 P.2d 21, 22 (1932) ; But cf. Western
Union Telegraph Co. v. Hansen & Rowland Corp., 166 F.2d 258 (9th Cir. 1948).
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quit or pay rent.22 But, as an examination of the briefs will show, in
those cases no argument was made specifically directed to the propriety
of doubling the rent which had accrued prior to the period of unlawful
detainer. In a considerable number of other cases the court has approved without discussion the doubling of rent which had accrued prior
to the period of unlawful detainer. 3 Other cases holding it proper to
double the amount of a general verdict24 carry with them the implication
that no distinction is to be made between damages occasioned by an
unlawful detainer and accrued rent, though in the facts of the cases
there were no claims for accrued rent.
If this were the whole of the picture one might conclude that, despite
its general policy with regard to punitive damages and the harsh potential of the rule under consideration, the Washington court was firmly
committed to a policy requiring the doubling of any accrued rent due
and owing at the time a tenant became guilty of unlawful detainer after
notice to quit or pay rent. The language used by the court in one early
case is, however, inconsistent with a practice of doubling accrued rent.
That case, Shannon v. Loeb,25 involved a tenant who held over and
remained in possession for one month after the expiration of a tenancy
for a specific term. The premises remained vacant during the following
month. The landlord then moved in and occupied the house. The trial
court entered a judgment for double the rental value for both months.
The supreme court held that the rental value for the month the house
was vacant after the tenants moved out could not be doubled. It said,
Because of the unlawful detention during September, respondents were
unable to give possession to their prospective tenants, and the house
remained vacant during October. The rental value that month is
found to be $110. This amount cannot, however, be doubled, since the
statute, Rem. & Bal. Code, § 827 [now RCW 59.12.170], only permits
the damages occurring and rent accruing during the time of the unlawful detainer to be doubled. There was no unlawful detainer subsequent
to the last of September. Hence,
from that time, any damage awarded
26
must be compensatory only.
22 Walker v. Myers, supra note 21; Brownie v. McNelly, 134 Wash. 380, 235 Pac.
807 (1925) ; O'Connell v. Arai, 63 Wash. 280, 115 Pac. 95 (1911) ; Agen v. Nelson, 51
Wash. 431, 98 Pac. 1115 (1909) ; State v. Pittenger, 37 Wash. 384, 79 Pac. 942 (1905).
23 Sowers v. Lewis, 49 Wn.2d 891, 307 P.2d 1064 (1957) ; Davis v. Jones, 15 Wn.2d
572, 131 P.2d 430 (1942); Bernard v. Triangle Music Co., 1 Wn.2d 41, 95 P.2d 43
(1939) ; Decker v. Verloop, 73 Wash. 10, 131 Pac. 190 (1913).
24 Bond v. Chapman, 34 Wash. 606, 76 Pac. 97 (1904) ; Quandt v. Smith, 28 Wash.
664, 69 Pac. 369 (1902).
25 Shannon v. Loeb, 65 Wash. 640, 118 Pac. 823 (1911).
2
0 Id. at 643, 118 Pac. at 825.
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If the rental value of property after the surrender of possession cannot be doubled because there was no unlawful detainer at that time, it
would seem as a matter of logic that rents which accrued prior to the
period of unlawful detainer should likewise be excluded from the
doubling process.27 Indeed, the case is stronger for doubling the rental
value of premises which the landlord had to leave vacant because of a
prior unlawful detainer. Such a loss of rent caused by an unlawful
detainer, even though occurring after the detention, would seem to be
a damage "occasioned" by the tenant's wrongful act and its doubling
would bear some relation to that wrong. The same is not true of
doubling the rent which accrued prior to an unlawful detainer.
Indeed, in another early case 8 the court was presented with an argument that, on a literal reading of the statute, rent could be doubled only
in cases involving a default in the payment of rent. In rejecting the
argument, the court said,29
This construction is ingenious but unsound. The plain reading of the
statute is that the court or jury shall assess the damages, and find the
amount of rent, and that the court shall thereupon double the amount
of the damages and rent. The construction contended for by the defendants disregards both the letter and spirit of the statute. The penalty
is not imposed for the nonpayment of rent, as the defendants suggest.
If it were, the Act could not be sustained on constitutional grounds.
The penalty is imposed for the refusal to surrender possession on the
termination of the tenancy, whether it be terminated by the terms of
the lease for nonpayment of rent, or for any of the other causes specified
in the statute.
Although the court's statement includes an apparent approval of
doubling accrued rents, it was uttered in a case in which the court did
not have to consider the problem. But if the constitutional rationale for
double damages is that they are a punishment imposed for refusal to
surrender possession, the propriety of doubling the accrued rentals is
called into doubt. As mentioned above, the doubling of accrued rentals,
which may vary from rent for one month to rent for one year or more,
bears no reasonable relationship to a tenant's wrong in remaining in
possession for periods varying from a single day to periods of months
27 See Wooding v. Sawyer, 38 Wn2d 381, 229 P.2d 535 (1951), for the proposition
that until the notice to quit or pay rent has been served and has remained uncomplied
with for a period of three days after its service, the tenant, though in arrears in his
rent,
is rightfully in possession, and only thereafter guilty of unlawful detainer.
28
Hinckley v. Casey, 45 Wash. 430, 88 Pac. 753 (1907). For another case with a
similar holding see Swanson v. Stubb, 108 Wash. 170, 183 Pac. 91 (1919).
29 Id. at 431-432, 88 Pac. at 753.

1962]

DAMAGES FOR UNLAWFUL DETAINER

extending to and after trial."0 If the unlawful detainer action has been
brought because of the commission of waste on the premises, or if it has
been brought because of the failure to keep a condition or covenant of
the lease, such as one prohibiting the conduct of illegal business on the
premises, the wrong of refusing to surrender would seem to be no
greater than the wrong of refusing to surrender after failure to pay rent,
yet the doubling of damages in the former cases is limited to a doubling
of the rental value for the period of time of unlawful detainer. If the
"spirit" of the statute is to impose a punishment related to the wrong of
a refusal to surrender, perhaps that "spirit" overcomes the harsh and
unreasonable result which a literal and grammatical reading of the
statute would require.
More recently the court was presented a case in which the complaint
prayed for the doubling of damages only during the period of unlawful
detainer. 3' Following the pleading rule which it had developed for unlawful detainer actions-that the prayer of the complaint is the limit
of the amount that can be recovered in an unlawful detainer action 3 the court said that it was not necessary to determine how much of the
unpaid rent could have been doubled under the statute. 3 From the
phraseology utilized by the court the inference may be drawn that this
is still an open question. More realistically, one may conclude that the
language used by the court manifests no more than a time-saving phrase
used to avoid research on an unessential point rather than acknowledgment of an unsettled state of the law. Nevertheless, the language is
there for counsel who wish to argue the contrary.
The short of the matter is that a strict and grammatical construction
of the statutory language is capable of producing a harsh and arbitrary
30

An unlawful detainer action is not rendered moot by a tenant's surrender of the

premises. The right to possession and damages for the period of unlawful detention
remain issues even after the tenant has vacated. Lochridge v. Natsuhara, 114 Wash. 326,

194 Pac. 974 (1921). See also Shannon v. Loeb, 65 Wash. 640, 118 Pac. 823 (1911).

But cf. Stevens v. Jones, 40 Wash. 484, 82 Pac. 754 (1905). Thus it is possible that a
doubling of the accrued rentals might be the consequence of a single day's unlawful
detainer under the strict grammatical construction of the statute.
31 Wooding v. Sawyer, 38 Wn,2d 381, 229 P.2d 535 (1951).
32 Golden v. Mount, 32 Wn.2d 653, 673, 203 P.2d 667, 679 (1949); Peterson v.
Crockett, 158 Wash. 631, 641, 291 Pac. 721, 724 (1930) ; State v. Pittenger, 37 Wash.
384, 79 Pac. 942 (1905) ; Gaffney v. Megrath, 11 Wash. 456, 39 Pac. 973 (1895) ; Hall
& Paulson Furniture Co. v. Wilbur, 4 Wash. 644, 30 Pac. 665 (1892). But cf. Hart v.
Pratt, 19 Wash. 560, 53 Pac. 711 (1898), holding that it is not error to award double
damages where they are "substantially" claimed in the complaint. (According to the
brief of the respondent in the case, the complaint prayed "for the sum of one hundred
and fifty dollars damages (and other damages), and for a further sum as damages equal
to the amount of damages which may be ascertained to be due plaintiff on the trial of
this action.. . "') Respondent's Brief, pp. 4-5.
33 Wooding v. Sawyer, 38 Wn.2d 381, 388, 229 P.2d 535, 539 (1951).
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result and one at odds with the general Washington policy on punitive
damages. A view that this result must follow because it is what the
legislature decreed is founded on what may be an unrealistic assumption that a statute containing twenty-five sections received from the
legislators such a careful reading that they would note and appreciate
the significance of the presence of the word "of" in the phrase "for
twice the amount of damages thus assessed and of the rent, if any,
found due." Conceivably the legislative draftsmen might have given the
choice of words that attention. 4 But the number of cases in which
counsel representing a landlord have failed to demand the doubling of
all of the damages to which their clients were entitled 5 under a strict
reading suggests that the significance of the word was not noted by
many of the legislators. Moreover, there is strong evidence that the
Washington statute was merely copied from an earlier California
statute enacted in 1874.6 The present statute, enacted in 1891, was a
redraft of a statute adopted in 1890.11 Only slight changes were made
in the section relating to judgments and damages.3 s And the language
of the 1890 statute and the language of the California statute are almost
identical. The California statute's provision reads, in the pertinent part,
".. . for three times the amount of the damages thus assessed, and of
the rent found due." The only structural difference between it and the
1890 Washington statute is that the Washington statute is not punctuated by a comma between the words "assessed" and "and."
Good reason for making a provision allowing the recovery of rents
34 Some evidence that there was a specific legislative concern over the punitive
damage provisions of the unlawful detainer statute may be found in the changes made
in the earlier statute, Wash. Sess. Laws, 1890, ch. 5 § 18, p. 79 by the statute enacted in
1891 (Wash. Sess. Laws, 1891, ch. 96. Thus the pertinent language was changed from
"... for twice the amount of damages thus assessed and of the rent found due," by insertion of the phrase, "if any," to read ". . . for twice the amount of damages thus assessed
and of the rent, if any, found due." Moreover, the 1890 statute permitted the tenant to
be restored to his estate upon payment of "... the amount found due as rent, with interest thereon, and the amount of the damages found.., for the unlawful detainer." The
statute enacted in 1891 permitted the tenant to be restored to his estate after default in
rent only upon payment of "the amount of his judgment and costs."
35 See cases cited, note 31, 32 supra.
36 Cal. Stits., Code Amendments, 1873-1874, Ch. 383, p. 349, § 153. This statute was
in turn a revision of section 1174 of the California Code of Civil Procedure as adopted
in 1872. The pertinent language of that provision was, "The jury, or the Court, in case
the proceeding is tried without a jury, must also assess the damages occasioned to the
plaintiff by the forcible entry or detainer, or in case of rent unpaid, the amount of rent
then due, and thereupon judgment against the defendant for three times the amount of
such damages or rent, as the case may be, so found or assessed, must be entered." If
anything, then, the language of the 1874 statute weakened the case for the tripling of
accrued rentals.
37 Wash. Sess. Laws, 1890, ch. 5, § 18, p. 79.
38 See note 34, supra.
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which accrued prior to the period of unlawful detention might be found
in an early California case." It held under an earlier form of the California unlawful detainer statute that, even where a tenancy was terminated for failure to pay rent, only those rents accruing after the
tenant's possession had become unlawful could be recovered in an unlawful detainer action. Correction of this result might well have been
the principal objective. Again, it is conceivable that the California
legislature had as a purpose the trebling of accrued rent as a penalty
for an unlawful detention of any duration. But one might be slow to
recognize such a harsh departure from the scheme laid down in the
English Landlord and Tenant Act of 1730,40 under which only the rent
accruing during the period of unlawful detainer was doubled. And the
presence of the comma in the California statute makes it possible to
attach the phrase "of the rent found due" to the antecedent word
"judgment," which though somewhat awkward, avoids the tripling
which occurs if it is, instead, attached to the antecedent word "amount,"
from which the comma separates it."' Unfortunately, there appear to
have been no California decisions concerning the tripling of the accrued
rent decided before the Washington legislature acted. Moreover, before
any definitive decision on the question was made,"' the California
statute was amended to allow the imposition of triple damages in the
discretion of the court. 3
One thing about the Washington statute is certain. If the legislature
copied the California statute without giving consideration to the harsh
and inequitable results that could follow from a strict grammarian's
reading of the language, it is unlikely, California experience to the contrary notwithstanding, that the oversight will ever be brought to it for
reconsideration. While apartment house operators and landlords in
general are sufficiently well organized to bring to the attention of the
legislature defects in existing statutory and case law, tenants guilty of
unlawful detainer form no natural economic or political group and are
most unlikely to organize a lobby to obtain repeal of such a defect.
Indeed, if the question is ever presented to the court, it might well
3

0 Howard v. Valentine, 20 Calif. 282 (1862) ; cf. 2

TIFFANY, LANDLORD AND Tax§ 283(b), at 1803 (1st ed. 1910).
40 Landlord and Tenant Act, 1730, 4 Geo. 2, c. 28, § 1.
41 The presence of such a comma in the Montana unlawful detainer statute was not,
however, given this effect. See Steinbrenner v. Love, 113 Mont. 466, 129 P.2d 101

ANT

(1942).
42 See Nolan v. Hentig, 138 Cal. 281, 71 Pac. 440 (1903).
43

Cal. Stats. 1907, ch. 37, p. 55 § 1. For the present text of the California statute,

see CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1174.
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weigh the probability of the question being presented to the legislature
for a clearer statement if it refuses to double accrued rents against the
improbability of any legislative consideration if it directs the doubling
&"
of accrued rents.
PLEADINGS IN UNLAWFUL DETAINER ACTIONS

Several other features of damage actions under the Washington unlawful detainer statutes deserve comment. As mentioned above, a line
of Washington cases45 established the principle that the prayer of the
complaint, or amended complaint, establishes the limit of the relief
which can be granted in such actions. These cases were decided before
the adoption of the new rules of pleading, practice and procedure, which
became effective on January 1, 1960. While Rule 8(a) of the new rules
states that a pleading shall contain a demand for judgment for the
relief to which the pleader deems himself entitled, the view of commentators on the new rules is that the section should not have the effect of
limiting the damages to those claimed." Instead, they suggest that
the courts adopt the liberal practice followed under Rule 54(c) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure," under which a judgment grants the
relief to which the party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled, even
if he has not demanded it in his pleadings. Of course, this would be so
much clearer if, as is not the case, the Washington rules included the
equivalent of Federal Rule 54(c). In the light of only the former
holdings concerning pleadings, the double damages of unlawful detainer might be considered special damages which must be specifically
stated pursuant to Rule 9(g) of the new rules of pleading, practice, and
procedure. 8 However, a number of years ago the court referred to the
"Compare

the experience in California, where a supreme court decision overruling

the doctrine of sovereign immunity, Muskopf v. Coming Hospital District, 55 Cal.2d
211, 359 P.2d 457 (1961), activated the legislature to consider the problem during a
two-year stay against prosecution of tort claims against the state. See CAL. CODE CIV.
PRoc. § 22.3, added by Cal. Stats., 1961, ch. 1404.
45 See note 33, supra.

46 Meisenholder, 77Te Effect of Proposed Rules 7 Through 25, 32 WASH. L. REV.
219, 234 (1957);

MEISENHOLDER,

COMMENTARIES

PLEADING, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 9

(1959) ; 3

ON

NEw WASHINGTON

RULES OF

ORLAND, WASHINGTON PRACTICE

174

(1960).
4

In pertinent part, FED. R. Civ. P. 54(c) provides, "...Except as to a party against

whom a judgment is entered by default, every final judgment shall grant the relief to
which the party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled, even if the party has not demanded such relief in his pleadings."
48 FED. R. Civ. P. 9(g) provides, "When items of special damage are claimed, they
shall be specifically stated." For discussions of Rule 9(g) see Meisenholder, The Effect
of ProposedRules 7 Through 25, 32 WASH. L. REv. 219, 243 (1957) ; MEISEnHOLDER,
COmmENTARIES ON NEV WASHINGTON RULES OF PLEADING, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
18 (1959) ; 3 ORLAND, WASHINGTON PRACTICE 262 (1960).
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market rental value of premises during a period of unlawful detainer as
"general damages" and subjected the sum to a doubling. 9
Since its adoption in 1891, the unlawful detainer statute has contained a provision that the laws of the state with respect to practice in
civil actions are applicable to unlawful detainer proceedings, except so
far as they are inconsistent with the provisions of the statute.5 0 But
this and the classifications as "general damages" of the rental value of
the premises was not sufficient to prevent the development of a special
rule for limiting the damages recoverable to those set in the prayer of
the complaint. While one may hope for a resolution of the problem
which will produce a uniformity of procedure and avoid traps for the
unwary, the prudent thing for counsel is to continue to include in the
prayer a request for the doubling of all damages until such time as the
pleading of some unfortunate attorney provides the occasion for clarification of the law.
MISCELLANEOUS OBSERVATIONS

There remain a miscellany of observations concerning damages in unlawful detainer proceedings. In one case 5 involving the termination of
a periodic tenancy there was more than a two-year delay between the
time notice was served and suit filed and the time of entry of judgment.
The court approved a judgment doubling the rent which had accrued
over a twenty-eight month period, noting that delays in the trial could
not be attributed solely to the landlord. The court further held, as it
has in other cases, 2 that neither tender of the rent during the period of
unlawful detainer nor actual payment of the rent into court from the
date of termination to the time of the trial were sufficient to avoid the
penalty of the double damages. Referring to an earlier decision, the
court said, "while our heart was with appellant, we must be guided by
the statute (Rem. Rev. Stat., § 827), which left no legitimate ground
for the exercise of our sympathy." 3 Nor is a tenant protected from the
penalty of double damages because he continues to occupy in good
faith under the protection of a temporary injunction.5
Owens v. Layton, 133 Wash. 346 at 348, 233 Pac. 645 at 645 (1925).
ro RCW 59.12.180.
49

51 Davis v. Jones, 15 Wn.2d 572, 131 P.2d 430; Cf. Aiken v. Solomon, 298 Mich. 123,
298 N.W. 476 (1941).
52 Young v. Riley, 159 Vash. Dec. 55, 365 P2d 769 (1961) ; Peterson v. Crockett,
158 Wash. 631, 291 Pac. 721 (1930) ; Armstrong v. Burkett, 104 Wash. 476, 177 Pac.
333 (1918); Shannon v. Loeb, 65 Wash. 640, 118 Pac. 823 (1911); Newmand v.
Worthen, 57 Wash. 467, 107 Pac. 188 (1910); Cf. Western Union Telegraph Co. v.
Hansen
& Rowland Corp., 166 F.2d 258 (9th Cir. 1948).
53
Armstrong v. Burkett, 104 Wash. 476, 479, 177 Pac. 333, 334 (1918).
5
4 Golden v. Mount, 32 Wn.2d 653, 674,

203 P.2d 667

(1949).
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The measure of general damages for the period of unlawful detainer
is the fair market rental value of the premises, which may or may not
be the same as the rent formerly reserved or paid. 5 Consistency with
this approach would require that the damages allowed as rental value
for the period of unlawful detainer be apportioned to the exact period
of time the tenant was in possession. At the common law, of course,
rent was not considered to accrue on a daily basis, as does interest, and
it was therefore not subject to apportionment according to time. The
tenant was obligated to make payment of the full amount of rent falling
due upon any day of his occupancy regardless of whether he occupied
for the full period for which that rent was payable. But unlawful
detention does not constitute any recognized landlord-tenant relation,
and the rental value of the property during such a period should be
awarded as damages and not as rent. In a recent case 7 the rental value
for the period of unlawful detainer was apportioned to the period, but
this was because of the limited prayer of the complaint rather than as a
consequence of the rule governing such a problem. The doubling of
rent which would have fallen due on a particular day except for the
unlawful detainer would not appear proper if the tenant vacated before
the end of the period for which that rent would otherwise have been
payable.
DAMAGEs FOR DETENTION AFTER T iAL

According to a number of cases, where the tenant remains in possession until trial, the damages which are doubled should not include anything for the period after the trial.58 The theory is that the tenant may
have moved out after the trial and a judgment for any further period
would be without support in the record. There appears to be no report
on any decision relating to the landlord's right to recover double damages for that period of occupancy in a separate action. If the court
adheres to the theory that unlawful detainer actions are special statutory proceedings it might well deny recovery of the double damages in
a subsequent general action upon the theory that they are a remedy
55
Finch v. King Solomon Lodge No. 60, 40 Wn.2d 440, 243 P.2d 645 (1952);
Reichlin v. First Nat'l Bank, 184 Wash. 304, 51 P2d 380 (1935) ; Brownie v. McNelly,
134 Wash. 380, 235 Pac. 807 (1925) ; Owens v. Layton, 133 Wash. 346, 233 Pac. 645
(1925). Cf. Davis v. Jones, 15 Wn.2d 572, 131 P.2d 430 (1942).
56 1 TiFFANY, LANDLORD AND TENANT, § 176, pp. 1071-1075 (1910). But cf. Seattle
Lodge No. 211 v. Par-T-Pak Beverage Co. 55 Wn.2d 587, 349 P.2d 229 (1960).
5 Wooding v. Sawyer, 38 Wn.2d 381, 229 P.2d 535 (1951).
58 Wilson v. Barnes, 134 Wash. 108, 234 Pac. 1029 (1925) ; Lochridge v. Natsuhara,
114 Wash. 326, 194 Pac. 974 (1921). Cf. Gaultney v. Adamson, 75 Ga. App. 406, 43

S.E.2d 778 (1947).
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available only in the special statutory proceeding. Such a holding
would create the unfortunate situation in which it could be tactically
desirable for a defendant in an unlawful detainer proceeding to press
for an early trial and to delay the appeal, occupying the premises during
the greater portion of his unlawful detainer at no greater expense than
the fair market rental value of the premises. In such a case, counsel for
the landlord probably should ask for a remand, permitting the reopening of the record for taking additional evidence in order that a judgment appropriate to the then current total fact situation could be
entered. In at least one case, in which the trial court decree had ordered
immediate restitution of the premises and the record showed that the
defendant tenant had subsequently filed the appropriate supersedeas
bond for the appeal, the court struck from the decree certain relief
granted the defendants, upon the ground that their remaining in possession had rendered that relief inappropriate. 9 While the case is not
squarely in point, it certainly offers support for the use of a remand
technique.
THE EFFECT OF LIQUIDATED DAmAGE CLAUSES
On one question concerning damages in unlawful detainer proceedings Washington law is in the unfortunate state of having directly conflicting authorities. That question is whether the presence of a liquidated damage clause in the lease and prior deposit or payment of the
sum designated as liquidated damages precludes the recovery of damages in an unlawful detainer action. In a 1911 decision, the court held
that the presence of such a clause did not preclude the recovery of unlawful detainer damages;" in a 1931 decision the court held that the
presence of such a clause did preclude the recovery of unlawful detainer
damages.6 Counsel did not call the attention of *thecourt to the earlier
decision, and it was not mentioned in the opinion filed in the later case.
Because the tenant in the later case surrendered the premises after a
short period of unlawful detainer the recovery of damages for that
period was not of great significance to the plaintiff, whose principal
objective was to double and recover the rent due and unpaid prior to
the unlawful detainer. Undoubtedly the court's attention was directed
59 Golden v. Mount, 32 Wn.2d 653, 679-680, 203 P.2d 667, 682 (1949).
00 O'Connell v. Arai, 63 Wash. 280, 115 Pac. 95 (1911) ; Cf. Barrett v. Monro, 69
Wash. 229, 124 Pac. 369 (1912).
62 Pacific & Puget Sound Bottling Co. v. Clithero, 162 Wash. 156, 298 Pac. 316
(1931).
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to that portion of the landlord's claim rather than to the right to recover
damages for a wrongful withholding of short duration.
The reasoning of the later decision denying unlawful detainer damages was that, damages for the breach of the covenant to pay rent
having been provided for in the lease in an amount specified as liquidated damages, there could be no recovery for rent due and unpaid
because the sum specified as liquidated damages had already been
paid. 2 There was, the court said, no further sum to which the landlord
was entitled. In the earlier case, a sum had also been deposited with
the lessor and designated as liquidated damages to be retained by the
lessor in the event of a failure to pay rent or perform other covenants
of the lease. The court reasoned that this provision of the lease did not
relate to the penalty for the unlawful detention of the premises. That
penalty was considered to be fixed by the statute."
The reasoning behind both decisions leaves something to be desired.
A landlord has an option to treat a lease as still subsisting despite a
tenant's breach, and sue for the rent as it comes due, or he may treat the
lease as terminated and sue for the damages caused by the breach. "
The alternative of suit for the damages caused by the breach is available
to a landlord who utilizes the procedures of the unlawful detainer
statute to regain possession.65 When a lease is terminated, liability for
rent which has accrued is not eliminated.66 Liquidated damage clauses
are utilized to cover the damages which would flow from the breach of
a lease; they are not intended to serve as a performance of the lease.6
Insofar as the claim of a landlord extends to accrued rents, it represents
an attempt to enforce the lease according to its terms for the portion of
the term during which the rents accrued. The existence of the liquidated
damage clause should not operate to preclude recovery of the rents for
the period prior to termination of the lease. If, as the Washington statute provides, accrued rents generally may be recovered in an unlawful
detainer action, the presence of a liquidated damage clause should not
produce a different result. Such a clause should be given effect only
with respect to claims arising out of the breach of the lease, and not
with respect to demands for specific performance of the lease provisions.
62 Id. at 159, 298 Pac. at 317.
63 O'Connell v. Arai, 63 Wash. 280, 284-285, 115 Pac. 95, 96 (1911).
64 Brown v. Hayes, 92 Wash. 300, 302-303, 159 Pac. 89, 91 (1916).
65 Ibid. at 303, 159 Pac. at 91.
6e

See Heuss v. Olson, 43 Wn.2d 901, 264 P.2d 875 (1953).

67 For a general discussion of security clauses in leases, see Piper, Lease Deposits in

Washington, 30 WAsH. L. REv. 236 (1955).
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If accrued rents generally are to be doubled as a penalty for unlawful
detainer, as they have been under the Washington statute, the presence
of a liquidated damage clause should have no effect.
The damages to which a landlord may be entitled upon termination
of a lease consist primarily of the difference between the rent reserved
under the lease and the rental value of the premises to the end of the
term."8 In the ordinary situation the damages do not include the reasonable market value of the premises for the entire remainder of the
term because the landlord will relet and will obtain that amount from
his new tenant. Only during the period immediately following termination, while the landlord looks for a new tenant, will the damages accrue
at a rate of the rent reserved, and thus include the reasonable rental
value of the premises for that period. Liquidated damage clauses are
used by the parties as a substitute for estimating both these elements of
the damages.
Unlawful detainer damages, however, consist primarily of the reasonable value of the premises for the period during which the tenant remains in possession unlawfully,"9 and do not include the difference
between the rent reserved under the lease and rental value of the
premises to the end of the term. In almost every case, there will be
some lapse of time between termination of the unlawful detainer and
the time the landlord finds and leases to a new tenant. This type of
damage has been attributed to the breach rather than to the unlawful
detainer. 70 Thus, it is clear that the liquidated damage figure does not
constitute the parties' estimate of the unlawful detainer type of damage,
and was not intended to serve as its substitute. Accordingly, while the
presence of a liquidated damage clause should bar recovery of damages
caused by the termination of the lease it should not preclude the recovery of the damages caused by a tenant's unlawful detainer of premises.
The injustice of a contrary holding may readily be seen if one contemplates a situation in which a tenant, guilty of unlawful detainer, successfully delays both trial and appeal and then limits his landlord's
recovery to the amount of a liquidated damage provision. In short, instead of paying even the fair market rental value for the period of detention, such a tenant would pay only a sum estimated to equal the
difference between the fair market rental value and the rent reserved
6s Brown v. Hayes, note 64 supra.
69 Note 55, supra.
70 Shannon v. Loeb, 65 Wash. 640, 118 Pac. 823 (1911).
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in the lease. Occupancy upon more favorable rental terms is difficult to
imagine.
ATTORNEYS' FEES

One other area of conflict in the Washington cases appears. In an
early case the court allowed a tenant to recover attorneys' fees in his
suit against the sureties on the restitution bond posted by a landlord in
an unlawful detainer action.' But in a subsequent forcible detainer
action the court refused to allow the successful plaintiff attorneys' fees,
saying they did not constitute a proper element of damage in such an
action. 2 The supreme court's statement of the claims and proceedings
in the trial court in still another case reveals that the trial judge in that
case refused to award attorneys' fees to a landlord who successfully
maintained an unlawful detainer action." The general rule in other
jurisdictions would appear to be that attorneys' fees are not an element
of damages in unlawful detainer actions.74
CONCLUSION

From this miscellany of comments concerning damages in unlawful
detainer actions a few major items appear. The court might well reconsider the practice of doubling of accrued rentals as a part of the damages awarded in such suits. Such a practice can produce a harsh and
arbitrary punishment bearing no reasonable relationship to the wrong
for which it is imposed. Particularly if the court adheres to a policy of
denying counterclaims and set-offs in unlawful detainer actions is there
a danger of injustice.
Counsel for landlord should, as a matter of caution, continue to claim
specifically all of the double damages to which their client might be
entitled until such time as a determination is made as to the effect of the
new rules of pleading, practice, and procedure has been made. In other
areas, it is hoped, this discussion may be of assistance to counsel in
locating and analyzing problems which otherwise do not clearly appear
in the statutory language or in the accumulation of decisions, some of
which have not been indexed or digested as completely as one might
hope. Finally, it is hoped this comment may be of some assistance to
the court in its tremendous burden of working with the accumulated
precedents in various specialized fields of litigation.
71 Corman v. Sanderson, 72 Wash. 627, 131 Pac. 198 (1913).
72 Enbody v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 147 Wash. 237, 265 Pac. 734

(1928). RCW 59.12.170, which governs the measure of damages in cases of forcible
detainer, likewise governs the measure of damages in cases of unlawful detainer.
73 Golden v. Mount, 32 Wn.2d 653, 657, 659, 203 P.2d 667, 670-671 (1949).
74 Forrester v. Cook, 77 Utah 137, 292 Pac. 206 (1930).

